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Abstract
The present paper proposes an asymmetric watermarking scheme suitable for fingerprinting and precision-
critical applications. The method is based on linear algebra and is proved to be secure under projection attack. The
problem of anonymous fingerprinting is also addressed, by allowing a client to get a watermarked image from a
server without revealing her/his own identity. In particular, we consider the specific scenario where the client is
a structured organization being trusted as a whole but involving possibly untrusted members. In such a context,
where the watermarked copy can be made available to all members, but only authorized subgroups should be able
to remove the watermark and recover a distortion-free image, a multilevel access to the embedding key is provided
by applying Birkhoff polynomial interpolation. Extensive simulations demonstrate the robustness of the proposed
method against standard image degradation operators.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking techniques have raised a great deal of interest in the scientific community after the pioneering
contribution by Cox et al. [1] (see for instance the books [2], [3], [4], and the references therein). The practice
of imperceptible alteration of a document to embed a message into it plays a key role in the challenging field
of copyright and copy protection and motivates the search for more efficient solutions. Here we investigate a
novel asymmetric watermarking scheme based on elementary linear algebra which, besides standard robustness
requirements, satisfies non trivial security and invertibility properties1.
Indeed, watermarking security is arising a great deal of interest in both academy and industry (see for instance
[6], [7], and [9]). The analogy with public key cryptography suggests to consider asymmetric structures, involving
1A preliminary version of this method has been presented in [5].
2a private key for embedding and a public key for detection (see [8] for a detailed survey). However, this property is
by no means sufficient in order to make a watermarking scheme secure: as remarked in [7], § 5, almost all available
asymmetric watermarking schemes can be defeated by a standard closest point or projection attack (see Section IV
below for details). On the contrary, the proposed method is definitely secure under projection attack, as we both
mathematically prove and experimentally verify.
On the other hand, watermarking invertibility is crucial for several applications where the image integrity should
not be irreversibly corrupted by the watermark insertion. This new paradigm has been the subject of both deeply
theoretical and application oriented investigations (see for instance [10] and [11]) and is still a very active research
area (see [12] and [13]). Specific applications include attribution of medical images for clinical purposes, copyright
protection of biological or satellite images, personal identification via fingerprinting or iris matching. The designed
scheme allows to completely remove the watermark and recover a distortion-free image by exploiting the knowledge
of the embedding key. In order to ensure the access to the original image only to authorized groups, we propose to
manage the embedding key in a distributed way. In [14] multilevel access is provided for precision-critical images in
a hierarchical context, while the proposed scheme allows on-off access for authorized or non-authorized groups by
applying a secret sharing scheme. The basic theory due to Shamir ([15]) relies on standard Lagrange interpolation,
while the hierarchical secret sharing scheme by Tassa ([16]) exploits subtler properties of Birkhoff polynomial
interpolation. Here we are going to adapt and simplify this last approach for the hierarchical management of the
embedding key, thus extending the results presented in [17] for the joint ownership of the original image. Even
though the mathematical framework is essentially the same, we point out that the application scenario is completely
different.
The present contribution addresses a problem of anonymous fingerprinting. Indeed, the proposed method allows
a client to get a watermarked image from a server without revealing her/his own identity. In the specific case of
biometric images, where a distorsion-free copy is needed for precision-critical applications, we consider the scenario
where the client is a structured organization being trusted as a whole but involving possibly untrusted members.
In such a context, the watermarked copy can be made available to all members, but only authorized subgroups
should be able to remove the watermark. Just to outline a realistic example where all the above ingredients are
involved, let us introduce a biometric laboratory which, after a long and careful work employing very expensive
machinery, has completed a high precision medical atlas and offers it to a publisher with the task of selling it
to as many as possible members of the scientific community. In this scenario, our innovative scheme allows any
research team to buy the access to the atlas in an anonymous way from the publisher, who provides each research
group with a watermarked copy and each member of the group with a share of the embedding key proportional
to her/his position in the group hierarchy. In such a way, individual use for applications where precision is not
3critical (for instance, teaching purposes) is admitted under the research group responsibility (indeed, the insertion
of a conventional watermark allows the authors of the atlas to discover and point out any leak to the publisher
without violating the privacy of the clients). On the other hand, any trusted authorized subgroup of the buyer team
by putting together the shares of its members is able to reconstruct a non-watermarked copy of the atlas for high
precision reasearch purposes.
We also stress that our approach substantially improves previous asymmetric schemes applying linear algebra.
Indeed, the eigenvector watermarking scheme introduced in [18] has been defeated by an effective attack (see [19],
Section 4.4) and the method presented in [20] is subject to malicious disabilitation of public detection (see [20],
Section III.B). On the other hand, the scheme proposed in [21] is proven to be secure under projection attack.
Unfortunately, in order to achieve such a property, the watermark cannot be chosen arbitrarily, but it turns out to be
heavily dependent on the host image (see in particular statement c) of the Theorem on p. 787, which shows that the
watermark is forced to be a suitable multiple of a sequence deterministically extracted from the original image). As
a consequence, the method of [21] is appropriate just for copyright protection, where only one key is assigned to
each image, but definitely not for fingerprinting, where every recipient is identified by its own key. On the contrary,
our approach is suitable also for fingerprinting, allowing the insertion into any image of an arbitrary watermarking
sequence. Of course, the application of a watermarking scheme for copy control requires a reasonable robustness
against standard image degradation operators. This is experimentally investigated in Section IV on two sets of
biometric images of different size and characteristics with quite satisfactory results in both cases. The embedded
watermark can be detected even in presence of a relevant amount of image degradation due to image processing
operators, such as filtering, compression, noise addition, etc., and combination of them.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section II we give a detailed description of the proposed
watermarking method; in Section III we discuss an anonymous fingerprinting scenario involving a hierarchical
access to the embedding key in a rigorous mathematical framework; in Section IV we address watermark invertibility
for precision-critical images, security under projection attack and robustness against several image degradation
operators; finally in Section V we draw some concluding remarks.
II. LINEAR ALGEBRA WATERMARKING
We are going to describe a subspace asymmetric watermarking procedure. In this kind of asymmetric watermark-
ing scheme the encoding and decoding algorithms as well as the detection key are public, while the embedding
key is kept secret. Let us fix an integer n ≥ 1 and a feature space X (for instance, the space corresponding to the
entries in the top left corner of the DCT) and decompose it into two orthogonal subspaces W of dimension 2n and
V . Next, we split W into two orthogonal subspaces G and H of dimension n and we choose matrices G and H
whose columns form an orthonormal basis of G and H, respectively. Finally, we pick an arbitrary watermarking
4sequence w ∈ Rn.
Let φo ∈ X be the feature vector associated to the original image. We write
φo = ψo + σo (1)
where ψo ∈ W and σo ∈ V , and
ψo = Gs+Ht (2)
The watermark embedding is defined by
φw = φo +Gw (3)
where G is the embedding key (see Figure 1).
Next we choose a symmetric matrix A (i.e., AT = A) satisfying
A(s+ w) = s+ w (4)
and an orthogonal matrix B (i.e., BT = B−1) satisfying
Bt = µ(s+ w) (5)
with µ := ‖t‖/‖s+ w‖ and we define
D = AGT + µBHT (6)
which is released to the public and is the crucial ingredient in the detection phase (see Figure 2). As far as B is
concerned, we point out the following easy fact.
Lemma 1: If s+ w 6= 0, then we can construct an orthogonal matrix B satisfying (5).
Proof: See Appendix.
The existence of A is ensured by the trivial choice A=I (the identity matrix), as already pointed out in [5].
However, in order to obtain higher detection performances we propose here a different choice for A. Namely, let
b1 :=
s+w
‖s+w‖ , complete it to an orthonormal basis (b1, b2, . . . , bn) of R
n (for instance, complete it to an arbitrary
basis and then apply the standard Gram-Schmidt orthonormalization process) and let N be the matrix with bTi as
the i-th column (i = 1, . . . , n). Fix now an integer k ≥ 3 and let
A = N


1 0 . . . 0
0 10k . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 . . . 0 10k


NT .
Hence A keeps (s + w) fixed and rescales norms of vectors in all other directions in order to minimize false-
positive probability.
5Let now φe be an extracted feature. The watermark detection is accomplished by the decision function
δ(φe) =


1 if |sim(s+ w,Dφe)| ≥ ε
0 otherwise
(7)
where 0 ≤ ε << 1 is a suitable threshold and
sim(s+ w,Dφe) =


(s+w)TDφe
‖s+w‖‖Dφe‖
if Dφe 6= 0
0 if Dφe = 0
(8)
Definitions (7) and (8) for the detector are motivated by the following result, which shows that the watermark is
perfectly detected in the feature vector associated to the watermarked image.
Proposition 1: We have sim(s+ w,Dφw) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that the detector needs only the matrix D and the vector s+w. Therefore, if we take (G,H,A,B) as a
secret key and (D, s+ w) as a public key, we obtain an asymmetric watermarking scheme.
III. FINGERPRINTING APPLICATIONS
In order to adapt the above watermarking scheme to anonymous fingerprinting, let us introduce an authority A,
a client C and a server S. The role of A is to provide a safe bridge between C and S ensuring both the privacy of
C and the security of S. More explicitly, A receives from C the request of an image and from S the corresponding
original image. Next, A associates to C a conventional watermark w and produces the watermarked image by using
the secret key (G,H,A,B). Finally, A distributes to C the watermarked image and to S the public key (D, s+w).
As a consequence, S is able to recognize a non-authorized use of the image without violating the privacy of C.
We stress that, in order to be sure that C and not another user is responsible of a violation it is essential that the
watermarked image is kept secret and the proposed method enjoys such a property. On the other hand, in the case
where C is a trusted hierarchical group, the embedding key G can be distributed to C in a hierarchical way in order
to allow watermark removal only to authorized subgroups (see for instance [14] for the case of precision-critical
images).
More precisely, let C be a group composed of h participants and let us consider a collection Γ of subsets of
C, which is monotone in the sense that if U ∈ Γ then any set containing U also belongs to Γ. A threshold secret
sharing scheme with access structure Γ is a method of sharing a secret among all members of C, in such a way
that only subsets in Γ can recover the secret, while all other subsets have no information about it. Assume that C is
divided into levels, i.e. C = ∪tl=0Ul with Ui∩Uj = ∅ for every i 6= j. In order to reconstruct the secret, we require
at least a fixed number of shares from each level. Formally, if 0 < k0 < . . . < kt is a strictly increasing sequence
of integers, then a (k0, . . . , kt;h)-hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme distributes to each participant a share
6of a given secret s, in such a way that
Γ =
{
V ⊂ U : #
[
V ∩
(
∪il=0Ul
)]
≥ ki ∀i = 0, . . . , t
}
Roughly speaking, a subset of participants can reconstruct the secret if and only if it contains at least k0 members
of level 0, at least k1 members of level 0 or level 1, at least k2 members from levels 0, 1, and 2, and so on.
In order to construct a suitable (k0, . . . , kt;h)-hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme for the embedding
key G, it is natural to apply Birkhoff polynomial interpolation. The key point is that the Birkhoff scheme involves
not only a polynomial, but also its (higher order) derivatives. To be formal, as in in [22], p. 124, let E = (Ei,j),
i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 0, . . . , d− 1, be an m× d interpolation matrix, whose elements are zeros or ones, with exactly
d ones. Let X = x1, . . . , xm, x1 < x2 < . . . < xm, be a set of m distinct interpolation points. For polynomials
P (x) =
d−1∑
i=0
aix
i
of degree ≤ d− 1 we consider the d interpolation equations
P (j)(xi) = Bi,j
for Ei,j = 1, where P (j) denotes the j-th derivative of P and Bi,j are given data. Here the unknowns are the d
coefficients a0, . . . , ad−1 of P (x). However, it is easy to convince ourselves that a Birkhoff interpolation problem
can admit infinitely many solutions even if the number of equations equals the number of unknowns. Indeed, think
for a moment at the case in which Ei,0 = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , h. In such a case, the interpolation system involves
only derivatives of the polynomial P , hence it keeps no track of the constant term a0, which remains undetermined.
More generally, elementary linear algebra considerations show that if a Birkhoff interpolation problem admits a
unique solution then its associated interpolation matrix E = (Ei,j), i = 1, . . . , d; j = 0, . . . , d − 1, has to satisfy
the following Po´lya condition
# {Ei,j = 1 : j ≤ h} ≥ h+ 1 0 ≤ h ≤ d− 1
(see for instance p. 126 of [22]).
The idea now is to exploit this necessary condition in order to ensure that only authorized subsets can access
the secret matrix G. Intuitively speaking, an evaluation of the polynomial itself carries more information than an
evaluation of any of its derivatives since it involves more coefficients; therefore it sounds reasonable to assign to
a participant of higher level the evaluation of a lower order derivative. More precisely, we propose the following
algorithm (see Figure 4):
1) Protect the matrix G with a secret key consisting of a sequence s = (s0, . . . , sz) with si ∈ R for every
0 ≤ i ≤ z.
72) Let d = kt and pick a polynomial
P (x) =
d−1∑
i=0
aix
i
where ai = si for every 0 ≤ i ≤ z and ai arbitrary elements of R for z + 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
3) Identify each participant of level l with a random element u ∈ R and associate to u the share P (kl−1) (u),
where P (k) denotes as above the k-th derivative of P and k−1 := 0.
Fix now a subset of the structured group V := {u1, . . . , um} ⊂ A with m ≥ d. Up to reordering we may
assume that ui ∈ Ul(i) with l (i) ≤ l (j) for every i ≤ j. Consider the m× d matrix MV whose i-th row is given
by
d
dxkl(i)−1
(
1, x, x2, . . . , x(d−1)
)
(ui) (9)
In order to reconstruct the secret sequence s, the members of V have to solve the following linear system:
MV


a0
.
.
.
ad−1


=


P kl(1)−1 (u1)
.
.
.
P kl(m)−1 (um)


(10)
in the unknowns a0, . . . , ad.
The key point is that (10) is a Birkhoff interpolation problem with associated interpolation matrix EV = (Ei,j),
i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 0, . . . , d− 1 defined as follows:
Ei,j =


1 if j = kl(i)−1
0 otherwise
(11)
In the following, we will provide two theorems that represent the theoretical framework for reconstruction of s.
Both theorems are based on the fact that V ∈ Γ if and only if EV satisfies the Po´lya condition.
Theorem 1: If V /∈ Γ then V cannot reconstruct the secret sequence s.
Proof: See Appendix.
Moreover, we can apply Theorem 10.1 in [22], p.128, whose statement can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2: A Birkhoff interpolation problem admits a unique solution for almost all choices of interpolation
points x1, . . . , xm, i. e. outside of a subset of Rm with m-dimensional measure zero, if and only if it satisfies the
Po´lya condition.
Hence our random selection of the interpolation points allows us to deduce the following:
Theorem 2: If V ∈ Γ then V recovers the secret sequence s.
Proof: See Appendix.
As a consequence, a set of participants of the hierarchical group C can reconstruct the secret sequence s, hence
access the matrix G and finally remove the watermark, if and only if it belongs to the predefined access structure.
8IV. INVERTIBILITY, SECURITY AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Standard watermarking techniques based on lossy compression such as least significant bit watermarking present a
possible drawback. Indeed, the manipulation of the image introduce a small amount of distortion which irreversibly
impacts its integrity. Although the changes are imperceptible, they need to be avoided in some precision-critical
applications, in particular for biomedical images, due to legal or scientific reasons.
In the proposed asymmetric watermarking scheme the knowledge of the embedding key G and the watermarking
sequence w allows to remove the watermark and therefore to recover the original image in a distortion-free way
as follows
φo = φw −Gw (12)
(see Figure 3). Extensive tests of watermark removal confirm that the recovered image is identical pixel per pixel
to the original one.
We point out that, even though it is not part of the public key of the method, w can be published without
occurring in additional security problems. Here security of the watermark refers to the inability by not authorized
users to decode the embedded sequence. As discussed in [7], § 5, the crucial test for asymmetric watermarking
security is represented by the projection attack. As explained in [21], III.B., p. 786, a projection attack replaces the
feature vector φw associated to the watermarked image with a feature vector φ˜ satisfying
‖φ˜− φw‖ = min ‖φ− φw‖
2 (13)
under the constraint
δ(φ) = sim(s+ w,Dφ) = 0 (14)
Hence, φ˜ is the non-watermarked feature vector closest to φw. By definition (8), condition (14) says that (s +
w)TDφ = 0, i.e., φ has to lie on the hyperplane through the origin of the feature space having normal vector
a = DT (s+w). As a consequence, the feature vector φ˜ satisfying condition (13) is the projection of φw onto this
hyperplane, which is given by
φ˜ = φw −
aTφw
‖a‖2
a (15)
The main result of [5] is the following:
Theorem 3: For every choice of the watermark w, our scheme is secure under projection attack.
Proof: See Appendix.
Figures 5 (c) and 11 (c) show the effect of a projection attack on a couple of sample images (Figures 5 (b) and
11 (b)). The resulting degradation is apparent (PSNR 15.9 and 16.4, respectively).
9We stress that the corresponding result in [21] implies that w is a multiple of s (see statement c) of the Theorem
on p. 787). On the contrary, the security of our scheme does not depend on a specific watermark, thus making it
suitable also for fingerprinting.
Robustness of our asymmetric watermarking scheme against standard image degradation operators and combi-
nation of them can be evaluated by simulations. We consider biometric images of different size and with different
characteristics and we run our experiments on two skew databases.
The first one contains 20 biomedical and biometric images, including human brain samples and irides for
identification purposes, of size 450× 430 on average. In order to implement the embedding procedure, we choose
X as the subspace corresponding to a 32× 32 submatrix in the upper-left corner of the DCT of the original image.
Next, we split X into W , corresponding to the upper-left 20× 20 submatrix, and its complementary subspace V .
Finally, we define G by randomly selecting half entries of W and H by taking the remaining ones. In order to
construct matrices G and H we simply orthonormalize random basis of G and H, respectively. We always set k = 3
and consider randomly generated watermark sequences of length n = 200, suitably scaled to meet imperceptibility
(see Figures 5 (b)).
First, an image of a iris (Figures 5 (a)) is watermarked and detection responses for 100 different watermarks are
investigated after the following attacks: additive white Gaussian noise with power 15 dB; additive uniform noise
in the interval [−20, 20]; 3 × 3 moving average; Gaussian lowpass filtering of size 3 × 3 with standard deviation
0.5; median filtering using the 3-by-3 neighborhood; resizing of a linear factor of 0.6 using the nearest neighbor
interpolation method; JPEG compression with quality factor 25%; 3×3 moving average and additive uniform noise
in the interval [−20, 20]; additive white Gaussian noise with power 15 dB and JPEG compression with quality
factor equal to 25%. Despite the different typology of the tested images and operations, detection works perfectly
in all cases. Indeed, the really embedded watermark is always identified by a peak in the plot of sim values (see
Figures 6 and 7).
Next, ε = 0.06 is set and the probability of detection is evaluated after a JPEG compression as a function of the
quality factor on a database of 20 images and 10 different watermarks per image. The results summarized in Figure 8
show that detection probability equals 1 for JPEG compression quality factor down to 20. Such performances seem
to outperform those reported in [8], Figure 6, where the detection probability for quality factor 20 is always less
than 0.3. A similar analysis for white Gaussian noise addition as a function of its power is reported in Figure 9,
where detection probability equals 1 for AWGN power up to 20 dB.
Finally, the false positive probability is measured by considering 20 unwatermarked images and 10 different
watermarks per image and letting the detection threshold ε vary down to 0 (see Figure 10). False positive probability
is definitely under 1/200 for every ε ≥ 0.18, thus improving the performances described in [21], Figure 6.
The same set of tests are also run considering much smaller biometric images representing faces (see for instance
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Figure 11 (a)) of size 150× 190 on average. In this case we have to reset all parameters and we choose X as the
subspace corresponding to a 15 × 15 submatrix in the upper left corner of the DCT of the original image. Next,
we split X into W , corresponding to the upper left 10× 10 submatrix, and its complementary subspace V . Finally,
we define G by randomly selecting half entries of W and H by taking the remaining ones. The matrices G and H
are constructed as in previous experimental setting, by simply orthonormalizing random bases of G and H and the
experiments are performed on a database of 40 faces. We set k = 3 and consider randomly generated watermark
sequences of length n = 50, suitably scaled to meet imperceptibility (see Figure 11 (b)).
Figures 12 and 13 report detection responses considering Figure 11 (a) watermarked with 100 different watermarks
and the same attacks as for Figure 5 (a). Also with such a different database, detection works perfectly in all cases.
Indeed, the really embedded watermark is always identified by a peak in the plot of sim values.
Figure 14 reports detection probability after JPEG compression as a function of the quality factor on a database
of 40 images and 10 different watermarks per image (ε = 0.035): also in this case, detection probability equals 1
for JPEG compression quality factor down to 20. A similar analysis for white Gaussian noise addition as a function
of its power is reported in Figure 15 (ε = 0.035): exactly as for the previous database, detection probability equals
1 for AWGN power up to 20 dB.
Finally, the false positive probability is measured by considering 40 unwatermarked images and 10 different
watermarks per image and letting the detection threshold ε vary down to 0 (see Figure 16). Once again, false
positive probability becomes definitely negligible for every ε ≥ 0.12. We point out that requiring false positive
probability close to zero would cause a few missed detections in the tests of Figures 6 and 7, as well as of Figures
12 and 13. Nevertheless, those cases correspond to heavy attacks (e.g. combined operators) that would make anyway
unusable the images for sensitive applications.
V. CONCLUSION
We present an asymmetric watermarking scheme which is robust against the most dangerous attack for asymmetric
schemes, namely, the projection attack. Moreover, the proposed scheme is suitable for fingerprinting, allowing the
insertion of an arbitrary watermarking sequence, and for precision-critical applications, guaranteeing the recovery
of a distortion-free image. The problem of anonymous fingerprinting is also addressed, in particular we consider
the scenario where the client is a structured organization. Accordingly, a multilevel access to the watermarking
removal procedure is provided, by exploiting advanced mathematical tools from the theory of Birkhoff polyno-
mial interpolation. Finally, our experimental results demonstrate robustness of the method against standard image
degradation operations.
Future work will deal with the optimal choice of the watermark embedding domain with respect to robustness
to geometric attacks and specific legal applications.
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VI. APPENDIX
Here we provide detailed proofs of our mathematical results.
Proof: [Lemma 1] If t = 0, just take B equal to the identity matrix. For t 6= 0, let a1 := t‖t‖ and b1 := s+w‖s+w‖ and
complete them to orthonormal bases (a1, a2, . . . , an) and (b1, b2, . . . , bn) of Rn. If M (resp., N ) is the matrix with
aTi (resp., bTi ) as the i-th column (i = 1, . . . , n), then M(1, 0, . . . , 0)T = aT1 and N(1, 0, . . . , 0)T = bT1 . The matrix
B := NMT is orthogonal since it is product of orthogonal matrices and BaT1 = NMTaT1 = N(1, 0, . . . , 0)T = bT1 ,
so (5) holds.
Proof: [Proposition 1] ¿From definitions (6), (3), (1), (2) it follows that Dφw = (AGT +µBHT )(Gs+Ht+
σo +Gw) = A(s+ w) + µBt = (1 + µ
2)(s+ w) by conditions (4) and (5). Hence from (8) we deduce
sim(s+ w,Dφw) =
(1 + µ2)(s+ w)T (s+ w)
(1 + µ2)‖s+ w‖2
= 1
Proof: [Theorem 1] Since V /∈ Γ, EV doesn’t satisfies Po´lya condition and it follows that the corresponding
Birkhoff interpolation problem admits infinitely many solutions. Thus V cannot reconstruct s.
Proof: [Theorem 2] Since V ∈ Γ, EV satisfies Po´lya condition and with a random selection of interpolation
points it is possible to apply Proposition 1. Thus the unique solution of the Birkhoff interpolation problem conveys
the secret: si = ai for i ≤ z ≤ d− 1.
Proof: [Theorem 3] By (6) we have a = DT (s + w) = (GAT + µHBT )(s + w) = G(s + w) + Ht since
AT (s+w) = A(s+w) = s+w by (4) and µBT (s+w) = t by (5). On the other hand, if we let ψw = φw − σo,
from (3), (1), (2) it follows that ψw = φo +Gw − σo = Gs+Ht+ σo +Gw − σo = G(s+ w) +Ht. Hence we
see that a = ψw and from (15) we deduce
φ˜ = φw −
ψTwφw
‖ψw‖2
ψw = φw − ψw = σo
by definition of ψw. Since σo ∈ V is the fragile part of the original feature vector, we conclude as in [21], III.B.,
p. 786, that the image reconstructed from φ˜ has a high probability of being perceptually distorted.
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